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https://github.com/frappe/gunicorn.git
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Merge pull request #3620 from benoitc/fix/asgi-proxy-protocol-trust-and-parsing
fix: enforce proxy_allow_ips and tighten PROXY parsing in ASGI
This commit is contained in:
commit
31f2618f73
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Provides callback-based parsing using either the fast C parser (gunicorn_h1c)
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or the pure Python PythonProtocol fallback.
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"""
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import socket
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import struct
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from enum import IntEnum
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@ -319,9 +320,19 @@ class PythonProtocol:
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if len(parts) != 6:
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raise InvalidProxyLine("Invalid PROXY v1 line for %s" % proto)
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s_addr = parts[2]
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d_addr = parts[3]
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# Validate addresses with the appropriate family. WSGI does the
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# same in gunicorn/http/message.py:_parse_proxy_protocol_v1.
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af = socket.AF_INET if proto == 'TCP4' else socket.AF_INET6
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try:
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socket.inet_pton(af, s_addr)
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socket.inet_pton(af, d_addr)
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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raise InvalidProxyLine("Invalid PROXY v1 %s address" % proto)
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try:
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s_addr = parts[2]
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d_addr = parts[3]
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s_port = int(parts[4])
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d_port = int(parts[5])
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except ValueError as e:
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@ -391,6 +402,13 @@ class PythonProtocol:
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family = (fam_prot & 0xF0) >> 4
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protocol = fam_prot & 0x0F
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# gunicorn is an HTTP server; only TCP (STREAM) makes sense. WSGI
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# rejects non-STREAM at gunicorn/http/message.py:_parse_proxy_protocol_v2.
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if family in (PPFamily.INET, PPFamily.INET6) and protocol != PPProtocol.STREAM:
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raise InvalidProxyHeader(
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"PROXY v2: only TCP (STREAM) protocol is supported"
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)
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if family == PPFamily.INET:
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# IPv4
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if len(addr_data) < 12:
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@ -399,7 +417,7 @@ class PythonProtocol:
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d_addr = '.'.join(str(b) for b in addr_data[4:8])
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s_port = struct.unpack('>H', addr_data[8:10])[0]
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d_port = struct.unpack('>H', addr_data[10:12])[0]
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proto = 'TCP4' if protocol == PPProtocol.STREAM else 'UDP4'
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proto = 'TCP4'
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elif family == PPFamily.INET6:
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# IPv6
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@ -412,7 +430,7 @@ class PythonProtocol:
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d_addr = ':'.join('%x' % w for w in d_words)
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s_port = struct.unpack('>H', addr_data[32:34])[0]
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d_port = struct.unpack('>H', addr_data[34:36])[0]
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proto = 'TCP6' if protocol == PPProtocol.STREAM else 'UDP6'
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proto = 'TCP6'
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elif family == PPFamily.UNSPEC:
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# Unspecified address family
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@ -512,7 +512,23 @@ class ASGIProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
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'permit_unconventional_http_version': self.cfg.permit_unconventional_http_version,
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}
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if parser_class is PythonProtocol:
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parser_kwargs['proxy_protocol'] = getattr(self.cfg, 'proxy_protocol', 'off')
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# PROXY framing is only honored when the peer is in
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# ``proxy_allow_ips`` (the WSGI parser enforces the same gate at
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# gunicorn/http/message.py:proxy_protocol_access_check). Untrusted
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# peers get proxy_protocol='off', so any framing they send is
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# interpreted as malformed HTTP and rejected with a 400.
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cfg_proxy = getattr(self.cfg, 'proxy_protocol', 'off')
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if cfg_proxy != 'off':
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peername = self.transport.get_extra_info('peername')
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normalized = _normalize_sockaddr(peername)
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trusted = _check_trusted_proxy(
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normalized,
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self.cfg.proxy_allow_ips,
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self.cfg.proxy_allow_networks(),
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)
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parser_kwargs['proxy_protocol'] = cfg_proxy if trusted else 'off'
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else:
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parser_kwargs['proxy_protocol'] = 'off'
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self._callback_parser = parser_class(**parser_kwargs)
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def _on_headers_complete(self):
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@ -1286,9 +1302,19 @@ class ASGIProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
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"""Return the client address advertised via PROXY protocol if any.
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Falls back to the transport peername when PROXY protocol is disabled,
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the framing was absent, or the parser is the C variant (which currently
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does not surface PROXY metadata).
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the framing was absent, the parser is the C variant (which currently
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does not surface PROXY metadata), or the transport peer is not in
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``proxy_allow_ips`` (defense-in-depth: ``_setup_callback_parser``
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already disables PROXY parsing for untrusted peers).
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"""
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if getattr(self.cfg, 'proxy_protocol', 'off') == 'off':
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return peername
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if not _check_trusted_proxy(
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peername,
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self.cfg.proxy_allow_ips,
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self.cfg.proxy_allow_networks(),
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):
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return peername
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parser = self._callback_parser
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info = getattr(parser, 'proxy_protocol_info', None) if parser else None
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if not info:
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1
tests/requests/invalid/pp_03.http
Normal file
1
tests/requests/invalid/pp_03.http
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1 @@
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PROXY TCP4 not-an-ip 192.168.0.11 56324 443\r\n
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11
tests/requests/invalid/pp_03.py
Normal file
11
tests/requests/invalid/pp_03.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
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#
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# This file is part of gunicorn released under the MIT license.
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# See the NOTICE for more information.
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from gunicorn.config import Config
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from gunicorn.http.errors import InvalidProxyLine
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cfg = Config()
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cfg.set('proxy_protocol', True)
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request = InvalidProxyLine
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86
tests/test_asgi_proxy_protocol.py
Normal file
86
tests/test_asgi_proxy_protocol.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
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#
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# This file is part of gunicorn released under the MIT license.
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# See the NOTICE for more information.
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"""ASGI PROXY protocol parser tests.
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Covers the validation gaps that the WSGI parser already enforces:
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- v1 TCP4/TCP6 addresses must be valid IP addresses (inet_pton).
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- v2 must reject non-STREAM (UDP) protocols when family is INET/INET6.
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"""
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import struct
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import pytest
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from gunicorn.asgi.parser import (
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PythonProtocol,
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PP_V2_SIGNATURE,
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InvalidProxyLine,
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InvalidProxyHeader,
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)
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class TestProxyV1AddressValidation:
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"""v1 must validate IPv4/IPv6 source/destination addresses."""
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def test_v1_invalid_ipv4_source_rejected(self):
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v1')
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with pytest.raises(InvalidProxyLine):
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parser.feed(b"PROXY TCP4 not-an-ip 192.168.0.1 1 2\r\n")
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def test_v1_invalid_ipv4_destination_rejected(self):
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v1')
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with pytest.raises(InvalidProxyLine):
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parser.feed(b"PROXY TCP4 192.168.0.1 999.999.999.999 1 2\r\n")
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def test_v1_invalid_ipv6_source_rejected(self):
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v1')
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with pytest.raises(InvalidProxyLine):
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parser.feed(b"PROXY TCP6 not::an::ip ::1 1 2\r\n")
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def test_v1_valid_ipv4_accepted(self):
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v1')
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parser.feed(b"PROXY TCP4 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.11 56324 443\r\n")
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assert parser.proxy_protocol_info['client_addr'] == '192.168.0.1'
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assert parser.proxy_protocol_info['proxy_protocol'] == 'TCP4'
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class TestProxyV2NonStreamRejected:
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"""v2 must reject DGRAM (UDP) when family is INET or INET6."""
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@staticmethod
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def _v2_header(fam_proto, addr_payload):
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ver_cmd = 0x21 # version 2, command PROXY
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length = len(addr_payload)
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header = struct.pack('>BBH', ver_cmd, fam_proto, length)
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return PP_V2_SIGNATURE + header + addr_payload
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def test_v2_inet_dgram_rejected(self):
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# family=0x10 (INET), protocol=0x02 (DGRAM)
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fam_proto = 0x12
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addr_payload = b'\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08' + b'\x00\x50\x01\xbb'
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data = self._v2_header(fam_proto, addr_payload)
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v2')
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with pytest.raises(InvalidProxyHeader):
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parser.feed(data)
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def test_v2_inet6_dgram_rejected(self):
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# family=0x20 (INET6), protocol=0x02 (DGRAM)
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fam_proto = 0x22
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addr_payload = b'\x00' * 32 + b'\x00\x50\x01\xbb'
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data = self._v2_header(fam_proto, addr_payload)
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v2')
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with pytest.raises(InvalidProxyHeader):
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parser.feed(data)
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def test_v2_inet_stream_accepted(self):
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# family=0x10 (INET), protocol=0x01 (STREAM)
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fam_proto = 0x11
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addr_payload = b'\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08' + b'\x00\x50\x01\xbb'
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data = self._v2_header(fam_proto, addr_payload)
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parser = PythonProtocol(proxy_protocol='v2')
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# Followed by an HTTP request so the parser can transition out of
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# the proxy_protocol state without hanging on more data.
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parser.feed(data + b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: e\r\n\r\n")
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assert parser.proxy_protocol_info['proxy_protocol'] == 'TCP4'
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@ -597,11 +597,15 @@ class TestASGIProtocol:
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assert protocol._effective_peername(peer) == peer
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def test_effective_peername_with_proxy(self):
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"""PROXY-supplied client address overrides the transport peername."""
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"""PROXY-supplied client address overrides the transport peername
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when both proxy_protocol is enabled AND the peer is in
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proxy_allow_ips (matches the WSGI gate)."""
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from gunicorn.asgi.protocol import ASGIProtocol
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worker = mock.Mock()
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worker.cfg = Config()
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worker.cfg.set('proxy_protocol', True)
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worker.cfg.set('proxy_allow_ips', '10.0.0.1')
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worker.log = mock.Mock()
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worker.asgi = mock.Mock()
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protocol = ASGIProtocol(worker)
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@ -615,6 +619,34 @@ class TestASGIProtocol:
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assert protocol._effective_peername(("10.0.0.1", 1)) == ("203.0.113.5", 56324)
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def test_effective_peername_untrusted_peer_ignored(self):
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"""A peer outside proxy_allow_ips MUST NOT be allowed to spoof its
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client address via PROXY metadata, even if framing reached the
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parser somehow. Defense-in-depth for the trust gate that is
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also enforced in _setup_callback_parser."""
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from gunicorn.asgi.protocol import ASGIProtocol
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worker = mock.Mock()
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worker.cfg = Config()
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worker.cfg.set('proxy_protocol', True)
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worker.cfg.set('proxy_allow_ips', '10.0.0.1')
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worker.log = mock.Mock()
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worker.asgi = mock.Mock()
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protocol = ASGIProtocol(worker)
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protocol._callback_parser = mock.Mock(proxy_protocol_info={
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'proxy_protocol': 'TCP4',
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'client_addr': '203.0.113.99',
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'client_port': 56324,
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'proxy_addr': '198.51.100.1',
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'proxy_port': 443,
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})
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# Peer is 198.51.100.1 (NOT in 10.0.0.1/32) — must fall back to
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# the transport peername instead of trusting the spoofed PROXY
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# metadata.
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peer = ("198.51.100.1", 1234)
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assert protocol._effective_peername(peer) == peer
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def test_effective_peername_unknown_proxy(self):
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"""UNKNOWN PROXY framing has no client info; fall back to transport peername."""
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from gunicorn.asgi.protocol import ASGIProtocol
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